Philosophy of two lanes. How to rethink bilateral relations between Russia and the United States

The postmodernist Trump, who has overthrown the stick, is again captured by a conservative order. This lesson, received by the American president, is worth learning in Russia

At a press conference following the summit in Helsinki, Vladimir Putin said in particular: “We expressed our proposal to the President of the United States to think not only about practical issues, but also about the philosophy of building bilateral relations …”

Sometimes, an unexpected word in a special way highlights the usual contexts. Here this word “philosophy” is clearly not from the Putin’s lexicon. The more interesting is its meaning in referring to such a pragmatist as Trump, on the part of such an “operative” as Putin.

The philosophy of individual, arbitrarily isolated and small items is possible in principle, but still there is something in the “philosophy of bilateral relations” from the “globe of Ukraine”. Philosophy by definition claims to universality, especially when it comes to world-systemic connections. When they say and write about bilateral formats, they usually use more modest terms: concept, program, ideology or principles. Appeal to the “philosophy” of any given ties with a special, as much as possible, manner, tears up their status, especially if there is no philosophy of multilateral and comprehensive ties.

Such lexical surprises happen when too strong ideas can not be expressed directly or have to be contained in your own unconscious. But in operational politics it looks quite definitely – as to transparency, a subtle hint of an offer to negotiate separately, in a special horizon, slightly pushing other participants of the “concert”. After all, it is clear that in international politics, bilateral philosophy is possible only if it is considered, at least in potential, as universal and dominant, subordinating the rest. Otherwise it is “ink for the second class”.

It is difficult to shake off the impression that in the future textbook of history, the current government is preparing a place comparable to the post-war division of peace between the great powers

In fact, this is the general idea with the general idea, although the real balance of resources does not allow this. Ambitions in the symbolic world often outweigh realistic pragmatics. It is difficult to shake off the impression that in the future textbook of history, the current government is preparing a place comparable to the postwar section of peace between the great powers. In personalist optics with narcissistic bias, this is seen as a division of the world by leaders who formed the era. The victory in the Great Patriotic War (and, accordingly, in the Second World War) is not accidentally laid in the myth-base of the new Russian state. None of the slightly more peaceful achievements of our entire previous history is suitable as a prototype of the exploits of the present rule, beginning with the baptism of Rus and ending with industrialization and space in the Soviet Union. Hence the creeping rehabilitation of the figure of Stalin precisely as the architect of the Great Victory with an emphasis on the embedding of the ensemble of the USSR and the socialist camp in the overall architecture of the postwar world. An imaginative basis for the monument to the accomplishments of our time is ready-to remain on the Yalta bench by the side of Putin and Trump, liberating the place of Churchill as useless. (At the same time, the problem of hierarchy disappears: who is in the middle.)

It is easy to explain why in the last presidential election in the United States Trump was sick almost the whole of our political establishment, beginning with top-level functionaries and ending with deputies and hackers. The simplest calculation boils down to the fact that impulsive Donald, albeit with an unpredictable trajectory, is in any case better than the tough and unambiguously anti-Russian-minded Hillary. But the question is also that hardly anyone can be tried to divide into a new section of the world “from the shoulder”, except for Trump with his excessive self-conceit and signs of megalomania. For this role, it fits perfectly. His “oversized Ego” has already spawned in the States a long-running scandal with attempts to find out from a new president some form of narcissistic personality disorder.

Concerning the development of bilateral Russian-American geopolitical philosophy, it is said: “It would be useful to involve the experience of experts who know the history well, the nuances of Russian-American interaction.” And further: “The idea is to form an expert council of influential Russian and American political scientists, scientists, former prominent diplomats and the military.”

By the composition of the functional, we can assume that the product of such a team will be anything, perhaps even very interesting, but not philosophy in its own and strict sense of the word. It would not matter if the “philosophy” that provides the dreams and realities of the new course no longer existed in a latent form. She is present behind the scenes, only sometimes inadvertently protruding. Its essence boils down to the fact that the existing postwar system of international institutions is already shattered, which is fraught with the collapse of the entire global architecture. In this situation, it is important, ahead of all, to occupy all the cracks and lead the inevitable. This seems all the more far-sighted, if the process is to help, it is better from both ends. In the great image of Nikita Pryakhin, such a scene in our time would look like this: “This is coming out, so the story itself is coming to meet you? He said grimly. – He helps us. Oh, thanks. Now, then, as we wish, we will do it! ”

The problem with this “philosophy” is that, in the expectation of working on the lead, it itself is at the tail of new, and even more, future trends. People are enthusiastic, enthusiastically fit into all this extreme postmodernism just at the time when it starts to decompose, as it once was with the High Modern. Unfortunately, the civilizational, historical situation and critics of the current regimes and foreign policy strategies are perceived in approximately this way. Postmodern chaos, eclecticism and opportunism in the atrophy of basic values ​​and principles seem to them a sad, tragic and inevitable destiny, to which we are just entering.

A blow to the already haughty self-conceit inflicted “their own”: an ambiguous “imbecile” was added to the ambitious line

However, if we are not talking about sad statements, namely about philosophy, how it re-evaluates these conflicts, the picture is drawn differently. There is no linearity and no simple sequence. Modern as an “unfinished project” (Jurgen Habermas) continues in parallel with the postmodern, preserving the values ​​of classical humanism, the law, the sovereignty of the person and the right order, these values ​​of the providing in life. With all its delights, postmodern is parasitic, since it is possible only on the platform of the ongoing New Time. By itself, in its pure form, it is pure self-destruction. Moreover, from the chaotism and virtuality of postmodernism is already beginning to turn, as it once was from the dry, excess order of megaprojects of the advancing Modernity. The team runs off to the wrong side, without even noticing that the boat is changing the tack again.

All of this may seem to be too abstract matters, if not for living illustrations, including on the aftereffects of the same summit in Helsinki. Trump was clearly (though a bit perplexed) inspired by the prospects of a new grandeur and omnipotence: not to change the world through the knee in parity with conservative Europe. But the narrative of triumph was suddenly replaced by a narrative of failure and betrayal. The blow to the already self-inflicted self-conceit caused “their own”: an ambiguous “imbecile” was added to the line of ambition. But even more insulting may be initially unnoticed loss to Putin, who almost all the “triumph” cleverly privatized. A classic example of self-denial and self-destruction in the postmodern style. The postmodernist who has overturned the stick returns to the paws of a conservative order, which not only hobbles him severely, but does not intend to collapse in the foreseeable future.

It would be wrong to think that these American passions do not matter to us right up to the mirror meaning. Therefore, there are all chances, analyzing this experience and seriously tackling philosophy, come to the need to change ideology – both the course and the coordinate system itself.